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In 2010, the UK government passed contracts for the provision of dispersal
accommodation and reception services for asylum seekers to three private pro-
viders. This article explores the causes and consequences of this process, arguing
that dispersal has been reshaped through a confluence of ‘austerity urbanism’ and
privatization. The article draws on fieldwork in four cities (Birmingham, Cardiff,
Glasgow and Sunderland), including interviews with local authority representa-
tives, politicians, and asylum and refugee support services. The article highlights
the production of instability within asylum dispersal as an effect of austerity and
privatization. As a result, we witness a narrative of political neglect, shrinking
accountability and the slow recession of support services and expertise. Whilst
instability has often been a common facet of asylum policy in the UK, austerity
and privatization have meant that a limited concern with the social needs of
asylum seekers has been replaced with an increasingly revanchist agenda.
Keywords: asylum, dispersal, housing, privatization, neoliberalisation, austerity
Introduction
In January 2016, the issue of asylum seeker accommodation made national
headlines in the UK, following revelations that houses used to accommodate
asylum seekers in the city of Middlesbrough were identifiable by their red
front doors. The doors had been painted by an accommodation contractor,
Jomast, to help identify their properties for the purposes of monitoring,
maintenance and inspection. However, such identification also served to
expose the inhabitants of these properties to racism, harassment and vandal-
ism. The red doors marked the residences of asylum seekers relocated to
Middlesbrough as part of the United Kingdom’s dispersal scheme. The out-
come of this brief media attention was a Home Office inquiry into the
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accommodation involved and the immediate repainting of the doors. In this
article, I want to explore some of the processes and policies that underlie this
incident. In particular, I consider how the reception, accommodation and
support of asylum seekers in urban Britain have changed through privatiza-
tion. Moving beyond Middlesbrough, the article explores how the system of
dispersal and accommodation for asylum seekers in the United Kingdom has
been reshaped in response to demands for austerity that are both nationally
articulated and locally enacted. Through considering the effects of privatiza-
tion, austerity and policy instability on the ground, I argue that we see a
model of accommodation that has failed to prioritize the needs of its clients
and that has often ignored the lessons of the past. As I argue, the exclusion-
ary marking of red front doors is emblematic of a system built upon a drive
for fiscal savings at the expense of human dignity.
In considering the effects of privatization, this article makes two key con-
tributions. First, it brings discussions of asylum support and refugee resettle-
ment into conversation with an emergent body of work that examines the
politics of austerity. I argue that neoliberal frames of fiscal constraint, prod-
uctivity and competition increasingly underpin dispersal as both a social
policy of accommodating and regulating asylum seekers (Darling 2011,
2016a), and an economic site of profit-making and efficiency savings
(Darling 2016b). Second, it seeks to redress the focus on the nation state
that has often dominated refugee studies. This dominant focus has meant
that analysing the influence of domestic welfare regimes, fiscal policy and
local political negotiations has been less widespread than a concern with
international questions of refugee resettlement and protection. In doing so,
the article argues for an engagement with the workings of dispersal policy as
it is practised in relations between urban authorities, the Home Office, third-
sector organizations and asylum seekers themselves. Considering these ten-
sions and negotiations highlights how government policy is interpreted, re-
sisted and remade in practice.
In making these arguments, the article proceeds in three sections. In the
first of these, I outline current work on dispersal within refugee studies and
geography, and consider recent debates around austerity urbanism as a
means of framing the contemporary dispersal system in the United
Kingdom. The next section draws on empirical material from a study of
four United Kingdom cities to consider how the effects of privatizing accom-
modation are shaped by austerity, and how these processes produce an in-
creasingly unstable dispersal system. The third section provides a longer
historical view on dispersal and its local politics, to suggest that aspects of
instability and fragmentation have remained essential components of this
policy and that a turn to ‘austerity’ and its socially revanchist agenda is
not new for asylum seekers in Britain. I begin, though, by outlining recent
discussions of dispersal and austerity.
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Dispersal and Austerity
There is a long-standing tendency within much work in refugee studies and
political geography to focus upon the nation state as a key site of study,
analysis and critique (Gill 2010). This is, of course, understandable given the
primacy of the nation state in determining the status of refugees, in managing
processes of resettlement, and in shaping both international law and domestic
policy towards forced migrants (Mountz 2010). However, such a focus has
been recently, and necessarily, supplemented by a concern with exploring the
politics of refugee resettlement and forced migration within the nation state,
most notably in cities, reception centres and camps (Rygiel 2012; Sanyal
2012; Darling 2016a). This growing body of work explores the dynamic con-
fluence between policies and programmes designed by the nation state and
implemented within often widely differing urban contexts. This article signifi-
cantly extends these discussions of refugee reception through engaging ques-
tions of asylum dispersal and fiscal austerity, in order to produce the first
sustained analysis of how asylum accommodation processes are reshaped in
the context of both national austerity politics and, more specifically, a turn to
austerity argued to have been specifically ‘urban’ in character (Peck 2012;
Mayer 2013; Davidson and Ward 2014).
Policies for the dispersal of asylum seekers and refugees have been common
in a number of European countries over the last 20 years, often focused on
allaying fears of concentrations of asylum seekers in specific urban centres
(see Arnoldus et al. 2003; Robinson 2003; Wren 2003). In the United
Kingdom context, the dispersal of asylum seekers began in 2000, following
concerns over a concentration of asylum seekers in London and the South-
East (Andersson 2003; Robinson 2003). However, this policy was embedded
within a longer history of employing dispersal as a tool of refugee resettle-
ment, with refugee groups from Uganda, Vietnam and Bosnia all being sub-
ject to different forms of dispersal during the 1970s, 80s and 90s (see Marett
1993; Robinson 1993; Robinson and Coleman 2000; Darling 2013).
Historically, dispersal in the United Kingdom was not used as a widespread
means to manage ethnic segregation and settlement by comparison to other
European countries (Boswell 2003), but rather as a more targeted policy tool
for the integration of refugees and the management of specific forms of ethnic
settlement. More recently, explorations of dispersal have highlighted the need
to unpack the specific social and political challenges that come with the
enforced mobility of asylum seekers and to question the ‘policy-imposed lim-
inality’ that dispersal can produce for individuals removed from their social
networks and left isolated in alien surroundings (Hynes 2009; Squire 2009;
Darling 2011; Hynes and Sales 2010). Indeed, as Netto (2011b: 299) argues, a
‘major challenge to accommodating refugees in any urban setting is increas-
ing awareness of the distinctive circumstances of asylum seekers and refugees,
compared with other migrants’. Thus, recent work on dispersal has sought to
explore the local politics of dispersal as both a policy that shapes how cities
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engage with asylum seekers and as an experience shaped by urban contexts of
demography, social care and political support (Hynes 2009; Netto 2011b;
Darling 2016a). Within these discussions, Netto’s work in Glasgow finds that
[p]roblems such as racial harassment and abuse were more extreme in areas with
little previous history of accommodating people from other ethnic groups, indi-
cating the need to incorporate a temporal dimension in considering conducive
locations for refugee settlement (Netto 2011a: 126).
Findings from initial analyses of the United Kingdom’s dispersal programme
support this assertion, with Zetter et al.’s (2003) work for the Home Office
concluding that shortcomings in information sharing were undermining the
effectiveness of dispersal, producing an uneven geography of support across
the country. Phillips (2006: 544) highlights the fact that, in the initial stages of
dispersal, local authorities were ‘key players’ due to their ‘partnership role in
the regional consortia’ that provided accommodation. Yet the reliance on
local authorities to offer accommodation resulted in dispersal being focused
in areas of low-cost and hard-to-let social housing. Often, as Phillips (2006)
notes, this meant asylum dispersals to areas of existing social deprivation,
economic stagnation and high unemployment. Importantly, the housing
market-led geography of dispersal has been argued to both isolate and mar-
ginalize asylum seekers through their association with areas of territorial
stigmatization (Phillimore and Goodson 2006; Spicer 2008), and has been
cited as a source of tension in local contexts often unprepared for the arrival
of asylum seekers (Finney and Robinson 2008).
Discussions of dispersal within the United Kingdom have thus examined
the liminality experienced by asylum seekers through the imposition of mo-
bility and fixity that this policy implies (Hynes 2009; Squire 2009; Darling
2011), and have also considered the local politics of dispersal as a policy that
places asylum seekers in areas of existing social deprivation and often poor-
quality housing stock (Phillips 2006). Today, both of these effects are being
reshaped in a landscape of fiscal austerity and widespread reductions in sup-
port for asylum services and third-sector organizations, and it is to this
changing landscape that I turn in this article, to consider how dispersal
changes as it comes to be practised in an increasingly austere context.
A focus on austerity has been growing across the social sciences, with the
term referring to
government policies that seek to reduce budget deficits and spending cuts by
reducing or freezing labour costs, tax increases, privatization, [and] a reconfi-
guring of public services and the welfare state (Donald et al. 2014: 5).
Austerity policies are not new as means of governing; rather, they have a
history of being evoked as a way to frame moments of ‘crises’ and to imple-
ment seemingly necessary ‘emergency’ responses (Blyth 2013; Donald et al.
2014; Stanley 2014). In this sense, austerity might be seen to operate as a
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specifically neoliberal governmentality—part of a wider set of narratives, im-
pulses and policies that contextually and contingently reproduce the primacy
of economic modes of calculation, prioritization and market ideology as
guiding social and political life (Peck and Tickell 2002; Brown 2006;
Dean 2009). Crucially, though, discussions of the recent ‘age of austerity’
(Stanley 2014) have focused on the ways in which austerity is produced at
the local level (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012), and through cities in particular
(Donald et al. 2014). A turn to examining ‘austerity urbanism’ (Peck 2012)
has thus drawn attention to how models of fiscal discipline, constraint and
retraction have been transferred to municipal authorities, alongside expect-
ations to ‘do less with less’. In this context, Tonkiss (2013: 322) argues that
an urbanization ‘of (and by) enclosure is a keynote of austerity politics’,
enacted through the privatization of ‘many spaces and services that used to
be publicly owned and more open and/or affordable’ (Mayer 2013: 9). The
urban effects of austerity are thus argued to be in the closure or privatization
of public space, social services and support structures.
Importantly, as Beatty and Fothergill (2014) highlight, in the United
Kingdom, this process of ‘enclosure’ and welfare retrenchment is geograph-
ically uneven, with many of the country’s poorest areas hit the hardest
through an austerity agenda that ‘rolls back’ support for the unemployed
and the economically marginalized (see Hamnett 2014). Whilst austerity poli-
cies draw on a concern with managing ‘crisis’, they have also been framed as
a means of reworking the state so as to enhance its economic potential, to
encourage efficiency and to reproach those seen as economically unproduct-
ive. Austerity and its effects have thus been argued to produce ‘rivalries
rather than building solidarities amongst those who ‘‘have little’’‘ (Hoggett
et al. 2013: 567), as socially marginalized groups are placed in competition for
scarce resources. In the context of asylum dispersals, the disproportionate
impacts of austerity on areas of existing deprivation, combined with a dis-
cursive focus on efficiency and competition in the allocation of what re-
sources remain, means that dispersed asylum seekers are now often located
in areas at the centre of the ‘age of austerity’ and its most divisive impacts. It
is, therefore, vital to consider not just how asylum dispersal is practised in
varied local contexts, but also how such policies have been reshaped by their
proximity to a politics of austerity and divisive competition.
In making this argument, the article draws on fieldwork from a larger
project examining the relationship between asylum seekers, dispersal and
urban governance in the United Kingdom. Focused on four cities
(Birmingham, Cardiff, Glasgow and Sunderland), this project involved 106
interviews with stakeholders in the asylum accommodation and support
sector, including local authority representatives, councillors, service providers,
support organizations, third-sector groups and asylum seekers. This article
examines interviews with those within the ‘asylum sector’ of each city, namely
those involved in either local authority, third-sector or voluntary service pro-
vision, in order to trace their experiences of asylum policy and how this has
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shifted throughout the period of dispersal (2000–present). In what follows, I
focus on how the privatization of asylum accommodation in response to
austerity has led to an increasingly unstable dispersal system, in which sup-
port organizations and local authorities are readily side-lined and their ex-
pertise lost. Yet, I also contextualize this shift through considering the longer
history of dispersal, and through narratives of austerity, loss and political
indifference that pre-date privatization. In doing so, I make the case that
austerity, and its urban manifestations, matters not just because it shapes
national policies and priorities in terms of support for asylum seekers.
Rather, it matters because austerity moulds the local context into which
asylum seekers are dispersed. The intersections between austerity and disper-
sal are thus multiple and multi-scalar and, in the remainder of this article, I
shall begin the work of articulating a few of these connections.
COMPASS and Local Neoliberalisms
In examining these questions, this article explores the effect of transferring
contracts for the provision of asylum seeker accommodation from a mixture
of consortia of local authorities, social housing associations and private pro-
viders to just three private contractors. The multinational security services
company G4S, the international services company Serco and the accommo-
dation partnership Clearel. These contracts, collectively known as COMPASS
(Commercial and Operating Managers Procuring Asylum Support) marked a
significant shift in the landscape of asylum support in the United Kingdom.
Whilst the COMPASS contracts were signed in March 2012, the dispersal
system itself has been in force since 2000. It was initially proposed in the 1998
Fairer, Faster, Firmer, White Paper in the following terms:
The administration of a new support scheme for asylum seekers, entirely sep-
arate from social security benefits, will require new national machinery to plan
and co-ordinate provision, obtaining information from around the country and
purchasing places either directly or by contracting with local agencies. Asylum
seekers would be expected to take what was available, and would not be able to
pick and choose where they were accommodated, but where possible placements
would take account of the value of linking to existing communities and the
support of voluntary and community groups. . ..This nationwide approach will
help to relieve the burden on provision in London, where the majority of
asylum seekers are currently concentrated (Home Office 1998: 8.22).
Imagined as a means to ‘relieve the burden on provision in London’, disper-
sal created a new geography of asylum across the United Kingdom. As
asylum seekers were relocated to social housing in towns and cities across
the midlands and north of England, Scotland and Wales, the notion of
‘spreading the burden’ of provision became commonplace rhetoric for
describing the accommodation process (Darling 2016b). Throughout the
2000s, the dispersal policy faced a series of challenges, from concerns over
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‘community cohesion’ and resources, to questions of integration and the need
for longer-term planning for the establishment of ‘new communities’, once
individuals had received refugee status (Robinson 2003; Zetter et al. 2003;
Griffiths et al. 2005). As Andersson (2003) and Robinson (2003) both note,
dispersal within the United Kingdom was heavily criticized from three per-
spectives: first, for the imposed mobility and regulatory oversight it entailed
for asylum seekers, producing an exclusionary system of control (Squire 2009;
Webber 2012); second, for its entanglement with a newly restrictive regime of
welfare entitlements and conditionality separated from the mainstream bene-
fits system (Sales 2002; Gill 2015); and finally for the delays in sourcing
adequate accommodate, the lack of communication with local authorities,
and the lack of support structures in place, all of which reflected the absence
of a coherent approach to, and effective management of, this new process
(Andersson 2003). As Webber (2012) notes, it was this confluence of factors
that led dispersal to the United Kingdom to be more heavily criticized than in
other European countries.
Yet, the changes brought in through COMPASS were not framed as re-
sponses to these challenges. Rather, they were positioned in the context of
fiscal austerity and a desire to cut the budget of the then United Kingdom
Border Agency (UKBA). In their investigation into the procurement of the
COMPASS contracts, the House of Commons Public Accounts Committee
found that the cost of providing
accommodation in 2011–12 was £150 million. In March 2012 the Department
decided to introduce a new delivery model involving fewer and bigger housing
providers than under previous contracts . . . . The Department, through the
introduction of these new contractual arrangements, aims to save around
£140 million over seven years (House of Commons Public Accounts
Committee 2014: 4).
Similarly, in describing the rationale behind COMPASS, a UKBA spokes-
person stated that
[c]ontracts for asylum services have been awarded to providers that demon-
strated that they could meet our high standards of support and ensure the
welfare of individuals. As well as providing a quality service, these contracts
will help to deliver estimated savings of £150m over seven years (UKBA, cited
in Hegarty 2012).
Whilst a range of government departments were under pressure to reduce
their budgets, asylum accommodation was targeted within UKBA as a rela-
tively easy area for austerity measures. Asylum seekers are unable to vote,
unable to work, are often demonized in the popular press and are constructed
as figures whose entitlement to any form of support is readily questioned
(Sales 2002). As such, they represent a group unlikely to garner a high degree
of public sympathy or political capital when faced with the impact of aus-
terity, not least at a time of wider public-sector cuts.
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The driving force behind COMPASS was therefore a desire to contribute
to the government programme of deficit reduction and austerity. The import-
ance of this connection to austerity is two-fold. First, austerity has been
argued to have played a central role in ‘amplifying’ and ‘extending’ the
reach of neoliberal governmentality into new domains of public life (Mayer
2013). As Newman (2014: 3292) states, within the orthodoxy of austerity, ‘we
must all change the ways we live and work according to an economic calculus
of debt reduction and financial stringency’, for fear of ‘the market as an
invisible but potent and demanding force’ (ibid.). In this context, the financial
crisis of 2008 and its subsequent fiscal aftermath presented ‘an opportunity to
implement more severe cuts than ever seemed justifiable before, and to push
through more privatization’ (Mayer 2013: 10), whilst maintaining, and even
enhancing, the importance of an economic rationale at the heart of various
domains of public policy.
Second, the impact of austerity is localized to municipalities, such that
understandings and experiences of austerity are refracted through the local
state and its services (Blanco et al. 2014). Thus, whilst Brenner and Theodore
(2002: 349) argue that cities are ‘strategically crucial geographical arenas’ for
the articulation of neoliberal policies, Peck (2012) suggests the emergence of
‘austerity urbanism’ has led to ‘the cumulative incapacitation of the state’, as
local authorities must ‘do less with less’ (Peck 2012: 630, 647). In contem-
porary asylum accommodation, this incapacitation is vitally important, as it
presents a geographically uneven range of responses to the privatization of
housing. For Peck, the public-sector cuts most commonly associated with
austerity
serves as a prelude to political instability and institutional degradation, to crisis
management, to backfilling efforts on the part of non-profit or business inter-
ests, and in some cases to de facto abandonment (Peck 2012: 629).
These effects might all be considered as impacts of a drive to reduce public-
sector support and provision through local authorities. In the context of
COMPASS, it is worth considering how austerity has shaped accommodation
and policy on the ground. To do so, I want to consider how COMPASS
might be seen to have produced moments of instability within dispersal.
Austerity and Instability
In considering the effects of COMPASS, I want to focus on Peck’s (2012:
629) claim that austerity provides ‘a prelude to political instability’.
Instability was a common theme expressed by those working within local
authorities, the third-sector and those supporting asylum seekers throughout
this research. For example, Laura, who worked for an asylum support or-
ganization across the north of England, argued that
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in terms of COMPASS you definitely lost council officers who were trained up
in asylum issues. It’s undeniable really. . .. I think generally across the council
services there is a lack of knowledge about asylum but that’s probably because
they don’t actually have any mandate to work with asylum seekers anymore
(Laura, interview, 2014).
Similarly, Farah, a representative from a third-sector organization in
Birmingham, noted that
when the local authorities were in contract, they obviously had a vested interest
in it and the money from the contract would then go back into support services
in that area, and what’s happened now is they’re not in contract, they have had
to cut money to those voluntary sector agencies and those support services,
demand is going up and up and up, you’ve got a private organisation that
doesn’t appear to always be listening, and that money isn’t being reinvested
into the community. So from the providers’ point of view I do see where they’re
coming from, they’re holding a contract directly with the Home Office and they
don’t think they need to do other things. . .But it is very different, and public
sector thinking and private organisation thinking is very different (Farah, inter-
view, 2014).
In both of these accounts, Laura and Farah highlight the distinctions of
investment, knowledge and capacity that marked the transition from a
mixed provision of accommodation between local authorities and some pri-
vate housing associations, to the privatization of accommodation under
COMPASS. The shift associated with COMPASS not only gave contracts
to private contractors; it necessarily also meant the end of public provision of
accommodation and support services through local authorities. As both
Laura and Farah argue, this has reshaped the relationship local authorities
have with asylum seekers as a constituent group. With no obligations to
provide accommodation, and no financial support to maintain asylum ex-
pertise within the local authority, those who formerly worked in the asylum
sector for local authorities were either transferred to new roles or sought
employment elsewhere.
The effects of this transition were discussed by David, a case worker for a
national refugee organization:
Some of those staff members may have transferred over to the private sector so
actually the local authority has lost its memory because the memory is sat with
individuals. . . local authorities are not great in terms of institutional memory as
are the Home Office because the staff turnaround is so frequent. . . I’ve been to
Home Office meetings where they’ve presented something and we’ve said this is
very similar to what you presented four years ago and they’re surprised because
they think that it’s a new idea. . . that happens quite a lot and I think you see
the same with local authorities, they start out knowing so much and then a lot
of the asylum departments or the specialist teams that were working with the
asylum seekers while they were being housed, those individuals have moved on.
So, it does feel like a bit of a retrospective step (David, interview, 2013).
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As David recounts, the transition of responsibility for asylum accommoda-
tion that came through COMPASS led to a loss of knowledge and expertise
within the local authority. This ‘institutional memory’ was not only of the
asylum system and its varied legal complexities and distinctions (Zetter 2007),
but also of the local context of dispersal, community relations, and those
practices and experiments that had made dispersal function more or less
effectively in the past. With such memory lost, the ability to reflect on past
mistakes, contextualize new policy approaches and crucially historicize what
may, or may not, work within differing local contexts of support, community
relations and demographics was dramatically reduced. Memory loss forms
part of the wider ‘institutional degradation’ that Peck (2012) suggests
marks urban austerity. As fiscal support for local authorities is removed,
so the capacity to retain staff, manage responsibilities and meet statutory
obligations is diminished, leading to local authorities that hold knowledge
and expertise over an ever-decreasing range of public service requirements
(Blanco et al. 2014). Whilst some staff and expertise have been transferred
from local authorities and support organizations to private providers, as
Farah points out, ‘public sector thinking and private organisation thinking
is very different’ (Farah, interview, 2014), leading to frustrations that the
approach to asylum had changed from being service-driven to profit-driven.
The implications of this transition effect both private providers and local
authorities. With the movement of former local authority staff to private
providers, we see a process of knowledge ‘downloading’ in action. In each
of the four cities studied, respondents cited examples of former colleagues
who had transitioned to work for providers such as G4S and Serco, but who
had left those organizations within 12 months of that transition. Varying
reasons were attributed to this turnover of experienced staff, but the distinc-
tion of ethos that Farah notes above was highlighted as significant.
Individuals felt that they could ‘make a difference’ to the delivery of these
newly privatized services, and often grew frustrated when it became clear that
the public service ethos they had worked to previously could not be so easily
translated. The inability to translate this ethos was put down to the funda-
mental importance of providing only those services accounted for in the
COMPASS contracts (see Darling (2016b) for a fuller discussion of the
role of contractualism), as a means to ensure the profitability of such con-
tracts. This meant that any additional forms of discretionary support or at-
tempts to go beyond strictly defined parameters of service delivery were to be
avoided, serving, as Gill (2015) argues, to reinforce the moral distance be-
tween bureaucratic functionaries and asylum seekers. This is not to suggest
that previous forms of local authority service delivery were orientated around
forms of care and compassion, but rather that the discretionary space in
which moments of care could occur was more readily available to service
providers less tied to the delivery of a profitable contract.
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In this context of ‘downloading’, private providers were able to utilize the
knowledge and expertise of specialists for a brief period of time so as to help
establish themselves in the field of asylum accommodation. Whilst it might be
argued that this process does ensure some level of continuity and means that
expertise is not entirely lost, it has two key consequences. First, it means that
knowledge is now mobilized for the purposes of a profit-driven adherence to
contract delivery, rather than to the public service ethos associated with local
authorities. And, second, as David points out, it means a crucial memory loss
from local authorities. In a context of tensions between local authorities, the
Home Office and private accommodation providers over asylum housing and
support, this loss of expertise and institutional memory to another key actor
in the dispersal system places local authorities further on the back foot in
negotiating such tensions (Darling 2016b). This form of ‘downloading’ know-
ledge is not unique to the asylum-dispersal field under COMPASS. Rather, as
varying public services have been privatized or co-opted by private interests,
the accumulation of institutional knowledge, networks and understanding has
been a key resource for private providers in social care, housing and proba-
tion (Clarke 2004; Williams et al. 2012; Fitzgibbon and Lea 2014). The types
of knowledge and expertise gained here, even for a short period of time, are
critical to the evolving neoliberalisation of dispersal accommodation (see
Darling 2016b). That is to say, the privatization of accommodation that
emerges with austerity is not a fixed expression of a neoliberal orthodoxy;
rather, it illustrates how neoliberal approaches to service delivery are adaptive
and incorporate new forms of knowledge and expertise so as to enhance their
effectiveness (Peck and Tickell 2002). The ‘downloading’ of local authority
expertise thus offers an opportunity to more effectively govern and manage
the asylum-dispersal system in the interests of profit.
The second implication of this loss of institutional knowledge and memory
is for local authorities and their capacity to manage the outcomes of asylum
dispersal. For, whilst expertise is lost, local authorities still retain responsi-
bilities for community cohesion and the social integration of refugees. In this
context, the loss of institutional knowledge and memory of asylum that
COMPASS affects is significant. As a range of analyses of the early period
of dispersal in the United Kingdom highlight, dispersal is successful most
readily where existing local communities are assured that their interests are
being protected, and that information is sensitively and clearly distributed in
advance of dispersal (Robinson 2003; Zetter et al. 2003; Netto 2011b).
Community preparation work and information sharing of this kind is not
an easy or quick task; it demands understanding and communication of the
asylum process, and a contextual grasp of local politics, communities and
sensitivities. Where such work has been most successful, in Glasgow for ex-
ample, changes in attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees have been
effected by committed and long-standing work from integration networks,
local authority teams and third-sector groups working together (Wren
2007; Bowes et al. 2009). In Glasgow, such work was required after an initial
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period of poor communication, racial harassment and violence towards
asylum seekers (see Hickman et al. 2008), and it is precisely this form of
incrementally achieved knowledge and expertise that is lost through the pri-
vatization of asylum accommodation.
Furthermore, the impetus to undertake preparation work is undermined
through reduced local authority budgets and a political climate where pub-
lically supporting asylum seekers is potentially divisive. This confluence of
factors is cited by Laura as a reason why community preparation work for
asylum dispersals across the north of England is highly geographically
uneven:
Council budgets are being slammed down to zero, it’s hard to persuade councils
to take this one as a big issue when there’s lots of other things that they feel
they should put their money in. Sometimes though. . . they kind of do good
things without telling anyone about it because they know it’s not a particularly
strong local vote winner. . .. It’s very mixed. . . if you have the right people
working in some councils you’re likely to get more awareness. . .. The worst
scenario is when you’ve got no awareness, no council mandate to work with
asylum seekers, no asylum teams, and in a place with high dispersal (Laura,
interview, 2014).
With COMPASS, the ‘council mandate’ that Laura references here has lar-
gely been removed and, with a loss of institutional memory and knowledge,
the awareness and support teams also mentioned here have dwindled in many
dispersal areas. Indeed, of the four cities examined in this research, only
Glasgow had managed to retain within its local authority any formal support
structures for working with asylum seekers. In studying policy discourses,
Barbeho¨n and Mu¨nch (2016: 49) find that Glasgow has promoted a narrative
of ‘fairness’ towards asylum seekers that contrasts the image of a ‘caring city’
with that of a ‘cold’ and distant ‘UK bureaucracy’, and retaining some level
of support within the local authority might be seen as one means to maintain
this image (see also Darling 2013).
The shifting fiscal context of COMPASS had further impacts within dis-
persal areas, most notably through knock-on effects for third-sector organ-
izations. As Sarah, a policy coordinator from Glasgow, highlighted in
relation to COMPASS:
one of the big side effects of that has been that it was more. . . there was more
money coming into Glasgow per person than there is now and Glasgow City
Council provided wraparound services that were factored into that in their
calculations. So there was excess money that allowed them to put more re-
sources into English for additional language provision. . .it’s to do with the
type of provision and the amount of money that’s available because what a
private company sector would see as profit local authorities were able to re-
invest into those additional services and they did do that and there was signifi-
cant added value to what they provided (Sarah, interview, 2013).
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In the Glasgow context, when the local authority held contracts to provide
accommodation, funding was able, at times, to be used to support wider
services and integration work, as also noted by Farah previously. In this
way, services such as language training, drop-in support and integration net-
works were maintained, often through multiple small sources of income. Yet,
as Sarah notes, with the privatization of this contract, any money over and
above the running costs of accommodation is cycled back into the share-
holders of a private contractor, rather than into third-sector organizations
or asylum support programmes. COMPASS meant not just a loss of control
and capacity for local authorities, but also a concurrent removal of support
for third-sector organizations and groups. At the same time, the wider politics
of austerity has produced an increasingly challenging funding environment
for third-sector organizations, with two effects. First, as Williams et al. note:
public austerity is resulting in funding cuts to the voluntary sector—a disinvest-
ment that is undermining the capacity of third-sector organisations to sustain
their presence in a landscape of escalating need (Williams et al. 2014: 2803).
Thus, within dispersal cities such as Sunderland that have historically had a
small but committed refugee sector of support groups and organizations,
funding cuts have led to their closure and a dramatically reduced capacity
to provide advice and support to asylum seekers. Second, an austerity-driven
focus on funding competition has placed third-sector organizations in ‘‘‘de-
fensive’’ mode, developing strategic and operational solutions for their own
survival’ (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012: 29–30) and encouraging an acquies-
cence to neoliberal norms of market efficiency and economic calculation.
Where organizations are able to survive funding cuts, a reliance on competi-
tive and insecure funding streams through increasingly rare government
grants presents a barrier both to developing longer-term strategies for sup-
port and to performing advocacy work that may be critical of government
policy (Gill et al. 2014).
The tensions of change noted above are further exacerbated when we con-
sider the model of outsourcing and subcontracting that has emerged through
COMPASS. As Warren, an asylum advocate from Birmingham, argues, the
centralized contracts provided by the Home Office mask a far more fractured
reality:
G4S will have the contract and then they’ll subcontract to someone, who then
may subcontract to someone else. So for the service users and for the agencies
trying to help and resolve things, it’s impossible to ever find out who’s going to
take responsibility for something. So the service user will say, I don’t know, I
haven’t got any hot water, and they’ll tell that to the guy that comes to see them
once a week. He’ll say, that’s nothing to do with me, you need to speak to G4S.
They’ll phone the G4S line. They’ll say, no, you need to speak to the guy that
comes. And it’s this endless deferral of responsibility and simple, simple
things. . . can go on for weeks and weeks and weeks (Warren, interview, 2014).
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The ‘deferral of responsibility’ that Warren recounts here was a common
concern among asylum advocates and support groups. The disengagement
of local authorities who no longer had contractual ties to asylum accommo-
dation or financial means to support asylum expertise meant that the space
for dealing with accommodation complaints or issues was evacuated and left
solely to private providers and the Home Office. As reports from both the
Scottish Refugee Council (2014) and the National Audit Office (2014) have
illustrated, the standard of accommodation in some dispersal regions has
been poor and complaints procedures are lengthy, complex and difficult to
navigate for those without high proficiency in the English language. Whilst
expertise and support have been lost at a local authority level through the
loss of funding, the subcontracting undertaken by private providers replaces
past provision with a complex system of multiple landlords, authorities and
intermediaries.
Reflecting upon the changes of COMPASS, we might argue that this tran-
sition has led to increasing instability and uncertainty within the asylum ac-
commodation system. The shift in provision has meant not only the loss of
some expertise, but also increased distancing between providers and asylum
seekers in their ability to complain and to receive adequate and timely
responses.
The instability that arises through COMPASS has also been extended
through those public service cuts and fiscal constraints that Peck (2012) sug-
gests are shaping austerity urbanism. Whilst COMPASS itself is partly a
response to austerity, the lack of subsequent support for asylum from local
authorities once accommodation has been removed from their remit reflects
the realities of local authority cuts and the need to prioritize resources ever
more carefully. The context of austerity in which the COMPASS contracts
were designed has meant that these contracts are modelled on the ‘bottom
line’ of provision and profit. The confluence we see here between a context of
austerity as a driving logic for the privatization of accommodation costs and
a political demand to regulate and control those seen as ‘unwanted’ within
the state reflects what Tonkiss (2013: 315) has termed the ‘dual logic of
cutback and crackdown’ at the heart of austerity. Similarly to Smith ‘s
(1996: 10) description of revanchism as the ‘ugly cultural politics of neoliberal
globalization’, in asylum dispersal, we see the fusion of an exclusionary pol-
itics of citizenship that demands ‘crackdowns’ on those ‘unworthy’ of accept-
ance and who are feared to be abusing what support is provided (Sales 2002;
Bloch and Schuster 2005) and a neoliberal governmentality of the market that
demands austerity for housing the unwanted.
Cutbacks and Crackdowns
Whilst it is tempting to view the changes of COMPASS as ushering in a
period of significant instability, it is important to contextualize this account
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by considering the wider political context of dispersal as a policy in place for
16 years. Doing so highlights that, whilst the austerity politics of COMPASS
has certainly extended and enhanced the neoliberal framing of asylum accom-
modation as an issue of cost-efficiencies and the ‘rolling back’ of state sup-
port, aspects of this process pre-existed the imposition of COMPASS. Taking
this longer-term view illustrates that, whilst dispersal may be subject to a
‘dual logic of cutback and crackdown’ (Tonkiss 2013: 315), this ‘dual logic’
has a long history when discussing dispersal. Indeed, the turn to an ‘age of
austerity’ that has been marked since the election of the Coalition govern-
ment in 2010 masks a much longer history of austere politics and cumulative
cutbacks in asylum policy. In the following section, I want to sketch some of
the contours of this politics to illustrate the continuities that mark asylum
accommodation as an arena of inherent instability. To do so, I focus on three
aspects of dispersal.
First, since its inception, instability can be seen as a constituent part of the
dispersal process due to the changing nature of asylum policy itself. As Ruth,
the policy coordinator for a national refugee organization, highlights:
the asylum process is complex, and shifts really quite often, even the language in
it shifts, you know. UKBA is no more, it’s now the Home Office, but nobody
quite knows what model they are working to now (Ruth, interview, 2014).
The shifting nature of asylum policy and its priorities is well documented,
with the New Labour government in particular producing new legislation on
asylum and immigration at a rapid pace throughout the 2000s (Squire 2009).
The effect of this turnover of policies is two-fold. First, as Ruth alludes to, it
becomes hard for those working in the asylum sector to keep up with the
demands of new policy priorities, restrictions and languages. When matters as
seemingly minor as the number of bags allowed to be taken into dispersal
accommodation, and as major as the institutional structure and oversight of
the Home Office, are both altered on a regular basis, this produces a context
in which continuity of service provision is incredibly difficult to achieve.
Second, the changing policies and priorities of the asylum system help to
generate a considerable turnover of staff within the Home Office and
within private accommodation providers. This is both because staff tire of
keeping track of the latest priority, and because those who are seen to be
adaptable and effective are often moved on to other areas of social policy
seen to be of greater importance. Whilst the transition to COMPASS led to a
loss of expertise and staff within local authorities, concerns over a loss of
knowledge, expertise and ‘institutional memory’ pre-date this shift in policy
and have been argued to be endemic within the Home Office (Webber 2012;
Gill 2015). The result of this turnover for those involved in asylum accom-
modation is a frustration at a lack of continuity, as Farah illustrates in re-
lation to her role as part of an asylum networking group:
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when you have a person from the Home Office at meetings. . . and they don’t
have that remit for housing or the background in housing then that’s been quite
difficult getting things escalated or things resolved. . .. [In the past] we have had
somebody from the Home Office, but we’ve had a number of changes in people.
And then it’s telling that whole conversation again to a new person, and so
that’s stopped conversations or stopped things happening (Farah, interview,
2014).
The turnover of staff involved here is significant, as it adds frustration and
delay to discussions between actors within the ‘asylum sector’ as key issues
are repeated and newcomers to discussions often lack the contextual know-
ledge required to effect change. A loss of staff expertise and knowledge also
produces a loss of personal connections and relationships developed over
considerable periods of time. In working with the Home Office and others,
relationships of trust are essential for both asylum support organizations,
local authorities and third-sector groups, yet these are undermined if there
is never an opportunity to develop connections with specific individuals re-
sponsible for policy or decision-making. Furthermore, the turnover of staff
creates a context in which addressing concerns is a drawn-out and hard-
fought process, often being passed from one intermediary to the next as
individuals shift positions and roles. Again, this creates a highly unstable
environment for the effective implementation of asylum policy and for
those seeking to address the failures of asylum accommodation in terms of
quality standards and the rights of asylum seekers.
Second, whilst the provision of accommodation seen under COMPASS has
focused on sourcing housing from the lowest-cost markets in the private
rental sector, previous models still largely relied upon an economic rationale
of low-cost provision above other concerns. As Paul, a policy coordinator for
a third-sector organization in the midlands, outlines:
looking at a map of dispersal areas in the UK it’s quite clear that the Home
Office have made that decision or processed that decision based on housing but
there’s so many other factors that need to be considered they’re always kind of
a bit of an after-thought (Paul, interview, 2013).
Similarly, Gareth argues that, in the initial phases of dispersal, the focus was
placed upon procuring accommodation in areas of low-cost housing, often
relying upon local authorities with empty social housing stock:
talking about when dispersal first happened and we started to develop orienta-
tion projects what we found was that generally the local authorities weren’t that
well consulted on dispersal. . . some local authorities blatantly didn’t want it to
happen and dispersal was really geared towards, well, the main driving factor
was availability of low cost housing (Gareth, interview, 2013).
Both Paul and Gareth highlight two significant aspects of dispersal: first, the
varying levels of political support and engagement that local authorities have
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had with the process; and, second, the dominance of an economic model
focused on utilizing available low-cost housing. For Paul and Gareth, as
for a number of academic explorations of dispersal (Robinson 2003;
Phillips 2006), it was the housing market and its areas of low growth that
dictated the map of asylum dispersal in Britain. This focus on the housing
market has continued through COMPASS but with an important distinction:
now property is sought in the private rental sector, rather than through social
housing. Whether in social housing or the private rental sector, there is a
continuity in how dispersal has focused on those areas of British cities most
stigmatized as ‘failing’ and ‘unproductive’ (Phillimore and Goodson 2006;
Spicer 2008). In this context, resentment towards asylum seekers has been
a consistent feature of dispersal (Bowes et al. 2009), and one made all the
more acute as austerity policies bite at the local level. As Lowndes and
Pratchett (2012: 24) argue, if it is ‘the poorest groups that suffer most
through the Government’s austerity measures then, by extension, it is the
most deprived localities that will be most challenged’, not least because the
effects of austerity are ‘politically, socially, institutionally and fiscally cumu-
lative’ (Peck 2012: 630). The cumulative effects of austerity combine to en-
hance resentments felt around asylum accommodation in the most deprived
areas of the United Kingdom, and indicate a dispersal system that has always
placed economic calculations of cost over and above the needs of both
asylum seekers and the communities to which they are dispersed.
Finally, as alluded to by both Paul and Gareth, the history of dispersal
highlights a dwindling of support for dispersal from many local authorities.
Warren summarizes this history in the context of the West Midlands:
When the whole dispersal programme came into effect. . . I guess there was quite
a lot of idealism about what that was going to look like. So the talk had been
from government about, well, we’re actually going to be, effectively, creating
these new communities in different regions of the country. . .. People are going
to build, kind of, self-sustaining communities that were going to be appropri-
ately resourced and supported. And then they never were. And there was also. . .
quite a lot of buy-in and support from local authorities. . . as time went on, that
[local authority support] just fell away until you got to the point where. . .the
administration in Birmingham were just saying actually, we’re going to wash
our hands of this entirely. . . and also, we’re going to make quite punitive noises
about it, as though the city’s actually been losing out from its relationship with
the dispersal process, which actually wasn’t ever the case (Warren, interview,
2014).
Initially, as Warren notes, there was some enthusiasm around dispersal from
local authorities, as they viewed it as a means to fill otherwise hard-to-let
social housing (Cohen 2002). Yet, over time, as concerns around community
cohesion grew and funding levels to support dispersal fell, enthusiasm dimin-
ished. In the case of Birmingham, these concerns were interwoven with a
context of political debate that Barbeho¨n and Mu¨nch (2015) argue views
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immigration as a point of potential urban ‘crisis’, thus shaping the context of
local political discussions of diversity, migration and asylum (Wilson 2015;
Barbeho¨n and Mu¨nch 2016). As enthusiasm for dispersal fell away,
Birmingham City Council withdrew from their contract with the Home
Office to accommodate asylum seekers and argued that they needed to
‘help the citizens of this city first and foremost’ (Yeoman 2010). Framed in
the context of a rise in homelessness in the city and in relation to urban
austerity, the issue of prioritization was at the fore of this public rhetoric:
‘With a long waiting list for homes, we really need all our properties for our
people in these difficult economic times’ (ibid.). The Birmingham case illus-
trates again that, for many local authorities, dispersal was viewed through a
predominantly economic lens, such that it was supported when profitable as a
means to gain rent from otherwise empty properties. As that income fell with
cuts to the level of funding available from the Home Office, the gains of
dispersal were calculated to be less than the political capital of opposing
asylum support at a time of austerity. In this context, the question of prior-
itizing ‘our people’ becomes both an economic calculation of diminishing
value and a political calculation of reinforcing distinctions between the
‘needy’ citizen and the ‘abusive’ non-citizen (Darling 2016b).
The asylum-dispersal system has therefore always represented an unstable
assemblage of interests, authorities and priorities. It has shifted as local au-
thority support has waxed and waned and as new policies and approaches are
experimented with. However, the shift undertaken through COMPASS high-
lights the role instability plays in the neoliberal governmentality of dispersal.
The unstable nature of asylum policy and provision on the one hand de-
mands a response that is flexible, adaptive and responsive to changing pol-
itical and economic conditions. This is precisely the mode of policy and
subjectivity that neoliberalism valorizes and promises—an ability to mutate,
adapt and create in response to changing external conditions (Peck 2010;
Haughton et al. 2013). At the same time, instability may offer moments of
‘impasse’ that ‘serve as a potential moment of dislocation in which ‘‘normal
politics’’ is no longer perceived to deliver satisfactory outcomes’ (Blanco et al.
2014: 3137). Instability in this way allows for, and legitimates, experimenta-
tion. If ‘normal politics’ and policies are no longer satisfactory, then alterna-
tives must be sought, not necessarily to reduce that instability, but rather to
meet the demands of efficiency and effectiveness that have underwritten dis-
persal. In this context, we might question how readily the privatization of
asylum accommodation may be used to experiment with the austerity-driven
privatization of wider areas of social housing and social care (see Daly et al.
2005; Smyth 2013).
Conclusion
In this article, I have offered an initial examination of the United Kingdom
asylum-dispersal system and its changing nature under privatization. Through
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exploring the effects of COMPASS contracts for local authorities, support
organizations and third-sector groups at an urban level, I have argued that
we see a system of asylum accommodation being reworked into an increas-
ingly insecure and unstable model of provision. Yet, at the same time, these
facets of instability and political insecurity have long marked dispersal as an
approach to housing vulnerable individuals. The focus on low-cost housing
and efficiency that runs throughout dispersal may have been extended
through COMPASS, but this does not mean that previous models of accom-
modation were focused on the needs of asylum seekers or on social care over
economic necessity. Rather, we should critically reflect on the confluence of
an unstable system of accommodation, with a politics of austerity that seeks
to ‘cutback and crackdown’ (Tonkiss 2013: 315) on those seen as problematic
to the state. It is this confluence that has shaped asylum accommodation and
support in the United Kingdom over the last 16 years, and that continues to
produce a system in which asylum seekers risk social isolation, harassment
and marginality.
Responding to such a system demands a renewed focus on the local con-
texts in which dispersal is lived, so as to both address the daily exclusions
experienced by asylum seekers and to practise alternative accounts of how
asylum seekers fit within communities across Britain. On the one hand, this
means utilizing the possibilities of local media and information campaigns to
‘reinvent the national through re-imagining local identity and re-negotiating
local networks of power and information’, as Finney and Robinson (2008:
409) suggest (see also Wilson 2015). And, on the other, this means employing
austerity not as a legitimation for exclusionary practices and cuts in support,
but to articulate the common challenges faced by those present within areas
hit hardest by austerity, regardless of immigration status. As Netto (2011b:
300) argues, ‘responsiveness to refugees needs to be undertaken within the
context of anti-poverty initiatives that target the socially disadvantaged
neighbourhoods that they may occupy’ (see also Bowes et al. 2009). At a
time of divisive austerity measures and pervasive neoliberal logics of compe-
tition and economic worth, this form of responsive identification across dif-
ference becomes even more important.
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